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Abstract
This paper surveys issues with respect to the structural modelling of econo-
metric tests of investment facing financial constraints, to their link with firms
data and asset prices, and to their consequences for macroeconomic modelling.
The key issue is to provide conditions which support the interpretation of the
sensitivity of investment to liquidity variables such as cash flow as a measure
of financial constraints. The structural modelling of investment facing financial
constraints is also limited by the structural modelling of the forces driving in-
vestment dynamics such as adjustment costs, which has not been so successful
empirically.
Keywords: Investment, Financial Constraints, Structural models
JEL Classification: D92.
Re´sume´
Cet article pre´sente des proble`mes associe´s aux tests e´conometriques struc-
turels des contraintes financie`res pesant e´ventuellement sur l’investissement des
entreprises, a` l’utilisation de donne´es de bilans d’entreprises et a` leur conse´quence
en terme de mode´lisation macroe´conomique. Le proble`me principal est de
pre´ciser sous quelles conditions l’interpre´tation de la sensibilite´ de l’investissement
a` des variables financie`re telles que l’autofinancement est une mesure des con-
traintes financie`res. Une autre limitation vient de la qualite´ souvent me´diocre
des estimations des mode`les structurels incluant des couˆts d’ajustement du cap-
ital associe´s a` des phe´nome`nes non financiers.
Mots cle´s : Investissement, contraintes financie`res, mode´lisation struc-
turelle.
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1. Introduction
This contribution is intended to stimulate ideas on the interplay between theory and
data when estimating investment facing financial constraints, a subject of applied
econometric research during more than forty years (since at least Meyer and Kuh
[1957]), and probably an pervasive feature of business financing during centuries. As
there are several excellent surveys dealing with these issues (e.g. Chirinko [1993],
Schiantarelli [1996], Hubbard [1998], Bond and Van Reenen [1999]), I will focus on
specific issues related to theoretical modelling and data and their macro-economic
consequences.
Liquidity variables such as cash flow, cash stock, leverage or the coverage ratio are
often found to be significant explanatory variables of investment. A recurrent debate
deals with how to interpret these sensitivities: what percentage of these estimated pa-
rameters is expected to be related to financial factors and why? What is the standard
error on this percentage? Conversely, what percentage of these estimated parameters
is expected to be related to other other factors and why? A methodological answer
is the estimation of structural parameters related to explicit characteristics of various
forms of financial constraints, instead of the estimation of reduced form parameters
(Lucas [1976]). The drawback of a reduced form is that estimated parameters are a
mix of structural parameters and of current, past and expected variables, for exam-
ple, investment liquidity sensitivities estimated in reduced form may or may not be
related to financial constraints. In 1993, Chirinko’s view was that empirical evidence
of financial constraints was found in many papers but was broadly inconclusive, being
too distant from an explicit or ”structural” framework. Since then, some progress
have been made in explaining more precisely how structural parameters are ”hidden”
in those reduced form parameters. However, it may be the case that the problems in
structural modelling of investment are not only due to financial constraints but also to
the modelling of investment dynamics and the capital adjustment process. Nonethe-
less, in the recent years, the use of micro-data has greatly expanded and many papers
have documented financial constraints through eﬀects of liquidity variables on invest-
ment in several countries. It is useful to point out where caveats remains in these
works.
A first section reviews three groups of testable theoretical models of investment
including or not capital market imperfections. A second section details some recurrent
problems in empirical tests of financial constraints on investment. A third section
discusses some recent macro-economic modelling taking into account the behaviour of
firms facing financial constraints. A last section concludes.
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2. Testable theoretical models
2.1. Three Groups of Investment Equations
Since Jorgenson’s work [1963], traditional estimations of investment are related to the
Marshallian condition equating the marginal product of capital with its marginal cost,
which builds on the arbitrage between the return from investing inside the firm and
the opportunity cost of investing cash outside of the firm. It is then followed by a
parameterisation of the production function as a constant elasticity of substitution,
which leads to the following demand for capital:
ln (Kt) =
Ã
σ + 1− σρ
!
ln (Yt)− σ ln (UCt) (2.1)
The stock of capital Kt is then a function of sales Yt and of the cost of capital UCt,
with elasticities related to structural parameters: the elasticity of substitution between
capital and labour denoted σ and the parameter of returns to scale, ρ. More precisely,
the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is exactly the opposite of the
elasticity of the stock of capital with respect to the cost of capital. This intertem-
poral neo-classical theoretical model without adjustment costs does leads to results
identical with those of a static model (Jorgenson [1963]). To compensate for this lack
of dynamics, econometricians usually add auto-regressive distributed lags: this takes
into account dynamics which are not directly derived from intertemporal optimisa-
tion. Lagged variable in this approach are subject to the Lucas critique in the sense
that they are not exactly related to parameters of the theoretical ”structural” model.
These auto-regressive distributed lags models are often estimated in first diﬀerences
(Chirinko, Fazzari and Meyer [1999]) or reparameterised in an error correction form
(Bond et al. [1997]). Recent examples of this approach taking into account the cost
of capital are found in Chirinko, Fazzari and Meyer [1999] and in the papers related
to firms investment in the Monetary Transmission Network of the European System
of Central Banks (for example, Butzen, Fuss and Vermeulen [2001]).
Standard investment models basing structural dynamics on intertemporal opti-
mization assume convex adjustment costs (Lucas [1967]). Alternative models include
fixed adjustment costs which are able to describe lumpy investment behaviour. In
the convex adjustment cost case, the empirical literature splits into Q models (test
on the marginal condition on investment) and Euler equation tests (test on marginal
condition on the stock of capital). In the first case, the market value of the firms
divided by the stock of capital (Tobin’s Q ratio, see Tobin [1969]) summarises all the
expected determinants of investment under technology conditions derived by Hayashi
[1982] so that:
It
Kt−1
= a+ bQt (2.2)
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where I is investment, K is capital, Q is Tobin’s average Q ratio (market value of
the firm divided by the value of its stock of capital), a and b are parameters.
The usual Euler equation can be written as:
FK (Kt, Lt) = UCt + JK
Ã
It
Kt−1
,
It−1
Kt−2
!
(2.3)
where FK (Kt, Lt) is the marginal product of capital, with Lt representing labour
and JK a function representing the arbitrage between the marginal cost of investing
now with respect to the marginal cost of investment in the future. The production
function is then parameterized as an homogeneous function of capital and labour, that
is a more general assumption than the constant elasticity of substitution production
function used in error correction models, which is a particular case of an homogeneous
function.
FK (Kt, Lt) =
ρYt − FLLt
Kt
(2.4)
FL is the marginal product of labour which is related to the marginal cost of labour.
This parameterisation allows to compute the marginal product of capital in such a way
that the investment flow appears explicitly only as a component of the marginal cost of
investing. The higher the growth of capital of the firm, (or the investment ratio), the
higher the cost of investing due to convex adjustment costs. The parameterisation of
the production function as an homogeneous function of capital and labour and the fact
that the investment ratio appears in the cost of capital leads to specific properties of
the estimated Euler equation in the perfect capital market case. The investment ratio
is a negative function of EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation
allowances) usually revealed by the parameterisation of the marginal productivity of
capital. With respect to Jorgenson’s approach with constant elasticity of substitution
production function, the sensitivity of the investment ratio with respect to the interest
rate is no longer constant: it is a function of parameters, such as the adjustment cost
parameters, and of other variables of the Euler equation.
2.2. Four Major Types of Financial Constraints
The microeconomic foundations of financial constraints are found in the economics of
asymmetric information. But, while there is only one way to know everything, there
are many ways for outsiders to have an incomplete knowledge of, for example, the
investment of a specific firm. As a consequence, there is a broad variety of auxiliary
assumptions describing various types of asymmetry of information leading to a variety
of micro-economic models. Getting an agreement on these auxiliary assumptions is
diﬃcult. This could require the testing of auxiliary assumptions of theoretical models
and not only their consequences, which are sometimes similar among those diﬀer-
ent models. This research strategy is not often chosen, but Himmelberg, Hubbard
and Love [2002] provide an example. It implies a quest for organizational data and
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measures of information disclosed by the firms, in their case, measures of investors’
protection. But more generally, applied work and macroeconomic modelling have used
simplified versions of financial constraints.
The literature focuses on four major ”simplified” capital market imperfections.
Important features are the distinction between retained earnings and new share issues,
which both accumulate into equity and the distinction between various types of new
debt.
• First, one can consider that external debt is related to an exogenous bankruptcy
or monitoring cost (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist [1998]) which implies a cost
premium with respect to internal funds. This cost premium may increase with
the amount of debt or of leverage (Cooley and Quadrini [2001]) and may also
include a fixed cost. It may also depend on other factors such as the flow of liq-
uidity, liquid assets, the growth of debt as well as exogenous firm characteristics
(Chirinko [1997]). This can be viewed as taking into account the credit supply
curve characteristics for this individual firm.
• Second, one can consider that dividends cannot be negative.
• Third, one can consider that new share issues incur a cost premium with respect
to internal funds: this cost premium for new share issues may be a fixed cost
(Bond and Meghir [1994]), or may increase with the amount of new share issues
(Cooley and Quadrini [2001]), or it may comprise both of these costs (Gomes
[2001]).
• Fourth, one can consider that the firm is facing credit rationing and new share
issues rationing as in Myers and Majluf [1984], or that the fixed cost of a new
share issue is suﬃciently high that it is not sound to issue new shares to meet
the firm’s demand for capital. An example is found in Stiglitz and Weiss [1981]
and Kiyotaki and Moore [1997].
At this point, the literature on financial constraints meets the literature on finan-
cial structure (Jensen and Meckling [1976], Jensen [1986], Hart [1995], Myers [2001]).
To simplify matters, three groups of results emerge: static trade-oﬀs sometimes inde-
pendent of the level of investment, financial hierarchy and credit rationing.
Let us consider first a well known static trade-oﬀ between bankruptcy costs and
the tax advantage of debt with respect to equity. Taxation is crucial for means of
finance, as it creates large cost distortions between equity and debt, since debt service
is deducted from corporate income tax; it also creates large cost distortions between
dividends and capital gains, as well as between new share issues and retained earnings
in most tax systems (Auerbach [1983], King and Fullerton [1984], Sinn [1990]). A
well known example, the weighted average cost of capital, is presented in corporate
finance textbooks such as Brealey and Myers [1999], where the cost of capital is a
weighted mean of the opportunity cost of equity and the marginal cost of debt. It can
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be derived from the tax distortion between debt and equity and the capital market
imperfection described in the ”first bullet point” alone, that is a rising marginal cost
of debt as leverage increases. The arbitrage between the taxation gain and the costs of
bankruptcy leads to an optimal debt/equity ratio which provides the optimal weights
in the weighted average cost of capital (Auerbach [1983]). In this case, this provides
an optimal debt/equity ratio which can always be reached instantaneously following
shocks aﬀecting capital demand or the costs of the means of financing capital, with
the help of negative dividends or new share issues who do not attract tax and/or
asymmetric information distortions of their cost with respect to the costs of retained
earnings. As soon as one assumes that negative dividends are prohibited and that
new share issues are more costly than new debt, there is no longer an optimal capital
structure derived from a static trade-oﬀ, but a hierarchy of means of finance (Myers
[2001]). This example suggests that assuming only one of the four major capital
market imperfections alone lead to focus on one among several financial regimes that
may confront firms in the real world.
Credit rationing diﬀers from an increasing cost of debt as leverage increases due to
a Lagrange multiplier related to credit rationing. This Lagrange multiplier measures
the gap between desired investment and realised investment, but it alters marginal
conditions (an explicit expression of this Lagrange multiplier can be found in Chate-
lain [2000]). Jaramillo, Schiantarelli and Weiss [1996] tested the opposition between
an increasing cost of debt as leverage increases versus credit rationing in an Euler
equation context, where negative dividends remain a possibility. More precisely, a
credit rationing regime implies that investment and leverage are always complements:
they both increases or both decreases. Conversely, the regime where the cost of debt
rises as leverage increases allows the possibility that investment and leverage can be
substitutes or complements. It depends on the relative shifts from one period to the
next in the capital demand curve (due to productivity shocks or demand shocks, for
example) with respect to the capital supply curves (retained earnings, credit and new
share issues curves).1
Consider the case where the capital demand curve is unchanged (for example, no
productivity shocks from this year to next year) and the firm accumulates retained
earnings, this causes the credit supply curve, which rise with the interest rate, to shift
to the right. It turns out that the share of debt in the means of finance decreases
whereas capital increases. Marginal increase of leverage and marginal increase of
capital are ”substitutes”. In the case of constant returns to scale, capital increases and
the amount of debt remains constant and equity rises so that leverage decreases. In the
case of decreasing returns to scale, capital increases and the amount of debt decreases
1The capital demand curve may be inelastic to the cost of capital in the constant returns to scale
case (e.g. Kiyotaki and Moore [1997] and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist [1999]) or decreasing with
respect to the cost of capital in the decreasing returns to scale case (Kaplan and Zingales [1997],
Gomes [2001], Cooley and Quadrini [2001]). In both cases, this curve shifts upwards following a rise
in productivity.
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(and not only leverage): it proves rational to decrease debt and, as a consequence, the
cost of capital in order to match a lower marginal return on capital related to a larger
size of capital. Then, marginal increase of capital and marginal increase of debt are
”substitutes”.
Conversely, consider now that a rise of productivity shifts the capital demand curve
upwards relatively more than the accumulation of internal equity shifts the credit
supply to the right. In this alternative case, investment and leverage both increase.
They are ”complements” as in the credit rationing regime. Chatelain [1999] proposed
a theoretical investigation of this phenomenon, where the hypothesis of a positivity
constraint on dividends proved crucial, and a preliminary empirical test. This example
shows that in these investment models of financial constraints, the question of the
adjustment of the debt or dynamic capital structure is related to investment demand.
It then interacts with the theoretical and applied econometrics literature explaining
leverage and the variation of debt (e.g. Anderson and Nyborg [2001]).
2.3. Financial Constraints and Other Features of Firms’ Investment
The interaction between financial constraints and other specific characteristics of busi-
ness investment oﬀers a fruitful way to improve the accuracy of our modelling of
investment behaviour of firms. I have already mentioned taxation. But financial con-
straints can also interact with irreversibility and uncertainty eﬀects (Arrow and Kurz
[1970], Dixit and Pyndick [1994], Trigeorgies [2002]). As mentioned above, financial
constraints can increase the fixed costs sometimes related to investment irreversibility.
Outside investors may also take into account the cost of the real option involved in
investing now in a specific project, that is the loss incurred by losing the option to
invest later on in other projects (Dixit and Pyndick [1994]). Similarly, a high uncer-
tainty over demand or costs may foster asymmetric information, which is related to
moral hazard. The higher the economic uncertainty, the more diﬃcult it is to assess
ex post what is due to management failures related to moral hazard or to economic
uncertainty. Financial constraints and uncertainty eﬀects are likely to be simultane-
ous. Investigating such a joint eﬀect is proposed by Lensink and Sterken [2001] and
Ge´rard and Vershueren [2002].
3. Recurrent Problems in Empirical Testing
3.1. Investment Cash-Flow Excess Sensitivity
The literature on financial constraints puts forward two diﬀerent interpretations of
investment cash flow sensitivities in the literature of financial constraints for any of the
testable model currently used (non structural reduced form, Q model, Euler equation).
The first one is as follows. Since at least Meyer and Kuh [1957] did their empirical
work on investment, it has been debated whether the investment cash-flow sensitivity
is a signal of financial constraints or merely a signal of expect profit. In this former
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case, cash flow is correlated with components of Tobin’s Q numerator, which is the
discounted sum of future cash flows of the firm. Cash flow may prove to be a significant
explanatory variable of investment due to the omission of the Q ratio in non structural
models or due to measurement errors in Q and Cash Flow model of investment (Bond
and Cummins [2001], Whited [2000], Gomes [2001]). In fact, alternative specifications
of the neo-classical model such as the Euler equations, as well as common sense,
suggests that both eﬀects play a role in panel data due to the heterogeneity of the
finance regime for firms. An attempt to isolate these two components inside observed
cash flow has been made by Gilchrist and Himmelberg [1998], for example, using vector
auto-regressive techniques on panel data. This general problem is widely acknowledged
and the isolation of these two eﬀects inside the investment cash-flow sensitivity remains
a diﬃcult task.
The second point has been put forward by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen [1988]
and combines two features. First, they estimated that, even if investment cash-flow
sensitivity does not necessarily reflect financial constraints, the excess sensitivity of
investment cash flow for some firms with respect to a benchmark group is more likely to
reflect financial constraints. Second, these groups of financially constrained firms have
to be found using sample separation criteria which measure the extent of asymmetric
information problems or the extent of diﬃculties in obtaining external finance (size
of the firm, size of intangibles, long term relationship with banks, high trade credit,
and so on). In more general terms, the higher the financial constraints and/or the
asymmetric information problems, the higher the investment cash-flow sensitivity.
The hypothesis that the excess sensitivity of investment to cash flow is rising the
greater the financial constraint has been refined by Kaplan and Zingales [1997]. They
proposed an inverted U-shape curve (rising then decreasing) for the investment cash
flow sensitivity as a function of the extent of financial constraints. When firms are
facing financial distress and a serious threat of bankruptcy, then the investment cash-
flow sensitivity will fall. A likely explanation is that the firm probably cuts investment
by much more than the fall in its cash flow, because it needs to use this cash for debt
repayments. Kaplan and Zingales’s critique can be viewed as a useful extension of
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen [1988], adding a new financial regime labelled ”financial
distress”, measured by a specific sample split indicator. They emphasize that it is
diﬃcult to get good sample selection criteria in practice because of the diversity of
financial constraints regimes (see also Kaplan and Zingales [2000], Fazzari Hubbard
and Petersen [1996 and 2000]).
There is an important econometric problem confronting these sample separation
criteria. Most of the ones used in the recent literature are likely to be endogenous.
This would imply a specific econometric treatment for this endogenous selection prob-
lem. For example, the sample separation criteria can be explicitly estimated using
Probit or Tobit estimation. Then switching regression techniques can be used (Hu
and Schiantarelli [1998]). Besides the general endogenous selection problem (which
may or may not cause significant bias in the estimated coeﬃcients), further analysis
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of sample separation criteria may be very useful to assess the first questions outlined
in our introduction: what percentage of these estimated investment liquidity variables
excess sensitivities is expected to be related to financial factors and why? What is
the standard error on this percentage? To assess the quality of sample separation
criteria as a signal of financial constraints, probit estimations can also provide this
additional information. If other variables signalling financial fragility explains ”more”
a sample separation criterion with respect to another sample separation criterion, and
if both of them lead to investment liquidity excess sensitivity, then one is able to
rank the quality of sample separation criteria as signalling more financial constraints
than other characteristics. For example, size is a sample separation criterion which is
intuitively perceived as a less precise signal of financial constraint than the fact that
the firm is financed by specific institutions (for example, ”keiretsu” in Japan as in
Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharstein [1991]) or the firm’s bankruptcy risk rating measured
by scoring based on several financial ratios (Whited [1992], von Kalckreuth [2001] and
Chatelain and Tiomo [2001]). These Probit explorations would complement intuition
on the accuracy of sample selection criteria with respect to excess sensitivity tests of
financial constraints.
3.2. Q Model and Financial Constraints
3.2.1. Average Q ratio capitalizes some of the financial constraint eﬀects
but not all of them.
The link between investment, marginal Q (ratio of a marginal change of the value of
the firm divided by a marginal change of capital) and average Q has been stated by
Hayashi [1982] under the assumption of convex costs of adjustment for investment.
Marginal Q and average Q are equal for a competitive firm with a constant return to
scale production provided that the adjustment cost function is linearly homogeneous in
the rate of investment and the level of the capital stock. A widely estimated equation
is the following:
It
Kt−1
= a+ bQt + cLIQt + εt (3.1)
where I is investment, K is capital, Q is Tobin’s average Q ratio (market value of
the firm divided by the value of its stock of capital), LIQ is a liquidity variable, a, b and
c are parameters and εt is an error term. When the liquidity variable is cash flow, the
model is called the Q cash flow model of investment and c is the investment cash flow
sensitivity. With respect to structural modelling, depending on circumstances, average
Q capitalizes the impact of some or all finance constraints so that the investment
liquidity sensitivity variable may reflect a specific financial constraint eﬀect (Chirinko
and Schaller [1995], Chirinko [1997]) or prove to be significant due to measurement
errors in Q (Gomes [2001]). In particular, Chirinko and Schaller [1995] point out that
the liquidity variable may be related to the hypothesis of a convex dependence of the
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cost of external finance on the growth rate of debt (related to flotations costs) in much
the same way as convex dependence of adjustment cost on the growth rate of capital
aﬀects the technology of the firm. A constraint such as the dependence of the cost of
external finance on leverage or on the stock of debt (not on the growth rate of debt)
is likely to be taken into account in the Q ratio (Chirinko [1997] and Gomes [2001]).
Testing this specific hypothesis amounts to considering that the relevant ”investment
financial constraint sensitivity” is c/(c + b) under certain conditions instead of the
investment liquidity sensitivity c. This leads Chirinko [1997] to reinterpret the eﬀects
of former studies. However, a competing structural interpretation of the Q cash flow
model excluding financial constraints was proposed recently.
3.2.2. Imperfect Competition and Decreasing Returns to Scale May Blur
Financial Constraints Signals
Recent theoretical papers departed from Hayashi’s (1982) set of hypothesis and consid-
ered firms facing imperfect competition and/or decreasing returns to scale to challenge
the interpretation of the investment cash flow sensitivity as a signal of financial con-
straints. They focus on the applied econometric model where investment is estimated
as a function of average Q and of cash flow. It turns out that decreasing returns to
scale for a firm facing uncertainty imply that the investment ratio is a reduced form
linear function of average Tobin’s Q and of the ratio of cash flow over capital, even
without financial constraints. These demonstrations complement the initial Lucas’ cri-
tique that the parameter related to cash flow in the Q cash flow reduced form model
of investment is not derived from a structural model of financial constraints.2
Abel and Eberly [2002] remove the assumption of adjustment costs and do not
consider financial constraints, but assume uncertainty. To introduce time series vari-
ations of the investment ratio, they had to introduce uncertainty on the growth rate
of the productivity factor, which implies uncertainty on average Q. To introduce time
series variation of the cash flow/capital ratio (cash flow is the revenue function before
paying the cost of capital), that is variation of average productivity, itself related to
marginal productivity, they assumed uncertainty on depreciation, which implies un-
certainty on the marginal cost of capital (the marginal product of capital is equal
to the marginal cost of capital). The existence of decreasing return to scale and/or
monopoly power in an uncertain framework leads to a non-linear dependence of the
expected investment ratio with respect to average Q and to cash-flow. Both linearised
coeﬃcients are a function of the cash flow/capital ratio (average productivity). Under
some uncertainty parameter conditions, firms with high average productivity (com-
bined with a high cost of capital, hence small firms with respect to capital, as they
face decreasing returns to scale or high market power) exhibit a higher investment
2Note that these demonstrations do not invalidate the existence of a cash flow channel of monetary
policy. But they found its source in uncertainty, imperfect competition and/or decreasing returns to
scale instead of financial constraints.
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cash flow sensitivity and a lower investment Q sensitivity than other firms. Hence,
sample separation criteria such as average productivity, the cost of capital, the size
of capital or market power indicators lead to excess sensitivity of investment to cash
flow.3 Finally, in that context, the uncertain growth rate of productivity is exogenous
and is not necessarily connected to size. Abel and Eberly also show that fast-growing
firms exhibit a higher investment cash-flow sensitivity and a lower investment Q sensi-
tivity than other firms. As a consequence, uncertainty and decreasing returns to scale
are able to generate excess investment cash flow sensitivity when growth is used as a
sample separation criterion without assuming financial constraints.
However, if the sample separation criteria are financial variables such as dividend
payouts, leverage, interest coverage, bond ratings (Whited [1992], Hubbard, Kashyap
and Whited [1995], Gilchrist and Himmelberg [1995]) or the composition of external
finance (Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox [1993]), or the Bank aﬃliation (van Ees et al.
[1998]) or ’keiretsu’ aﬃliation in Japan (Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharstein [1991]) which
are unrelated to the real characteristics of the firm (size, expected growth rate), then
evidence using these variables to identify financial constraints is not subject to the
confounding of financial eﬀects and firm real characteristics in the Q-cash flow model
of investment. What is more, a higher cost of capital may be due not so much to a high
depreciation rate, leading to a high investment ratio, but rather to a risk premium
related to financial constraints included in the financial cost of capital. If we add some
of the four major financial constraints in an Abel and Eberly setting, uncertainty
and decreasing returns are likely to sharpen the eﬀects of financial constraints on
investment with respect to the certainty model with constant returns to scale.
Cooper and Ejarque [2001] produce similar findings using another research avenue.
Using simulations of a model with structural parameters and indirect inference based
on the method of moments, they are able to replicate the reduced form results of a Q
cash-flow model of investment estimated on a panel data set by Gilchrist and Himmel-
berg [1995]. They found that firms with identical market power or identical (decreas-
ing) returns to scale but with a higher adjustment cost parameter (using quadratic
adjustment costs) and a higher autocorrelation of productivity shocks exhibit a higher
investment cash-flow sensitivity and a higher investment Q ratio sensitivity. They in-
directly infer that small firms are likely to exhibit a higher adjustment costs parameter
and higher persistence of productivity shocks.
This result is slightly diﬀerent from Abel and Eberly [2002], where an increase of
the investment cash-flow sensitivity goes hand in hand with a decrease of investment
Q ratio sensitivity. Both approaches indicate that the investment Q ratio sensitivity
is no longer exactly the inverse of the quadratic adjustment cost parameter, so that
the low values of this sensitivity found in applied studies do not necessarily reflect
extremely high adjustment costs in the context of decreasing returns to scale. With
respect to financial constraints, the observed persistence of productivity shocks may
3Their model does not take into account an industry equilibrium of firms with large or small
capital as in Gomes [2001] but deals with a monopoly in partial equilibrium.
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not necessarily be a purely technological phenomenon. Financial constraints may cre-
ate persistence in output due to internal equity accumulation or due to the persistence
of informational asymmetry characteristics. They are likely to decrease steadily over
time when outside investors learn more about the firm.
3.2.3. Measurement errors and capital markets short run valuation errors
Several papers investigate how measurement errors in marginal Q lead to significant
cash flow eﬀect. Gomes [2001] explores measurement errors on the price of capital
goods (often taken at a sectoral level and not at the individual level), which values
the stock of capital at the denominator of the Q ratio as well as measurement error in
average Q. Simulating his industry model by removing financial constraints, he finds
that significant cash-flow eﬀects can be found due to measurement error. Moving
on real data and a moment estimator robust to measurement errors, Erickson and
Whited [2000] empirically confirm the findings that Q can explain investment once
measurement errors are taken into account.
Plots of time series of variations of Q with respect to variations of investment may
show that the changes of Q are often much larger than the changes of investment, so
that the investment Q ratio sensitivity has to be small. Depending on circumstances,
it seems that the capital market may present short-run valuation errors. In Cummins,
Hassett and Oliner [1999], the response of investment rates to variation in average Q
are quite small and cash flow is a significant regressor. However, when they replace av-
erage Q with their measure of Q based upon earnings expectations, financial variables
are no long significant. Bond and Cummins [2001] produce a similar finding. They
consider to what extent the empirical failings of the Q model of investment can be
attributed to the use of share prices to measure average Q. They show that the usual
empirical formulation may fail to identify the Q model when stock market valuation
deviates from the present value of expected net distributions in ways that are consis-
tent with weak and semi-strong forms of the Eﬃcient Markets Hypothesis. They show
that the structural parameters of the Q model can still be identified in this case using
a direct estimate of the firm’s fundamental value, and implement this using data on
securities analysts’ earnings forecasts for a large sample of publicly traded US firms
in the 1990s. Their empirical results suggest that stock market valuations deviate
significantly from fundamental values. Controlling for this, they find no evidence that
the Q model of investment is seriously mis-specified.
The recent renewal of interest in Q model should not disguise the fact that more
and more data set are available for firms which are not traded on the equity market.
For those firms, which are more likely to be financially constrained, the market value
is not available so that the traditional estimation of the market value Q model simply
cannot be run. Applied econometrician would have to find analysts’ earnings forecast
for these non traded firms or build their own market value indicator. Firms can be
valued with the help of a few retrospective balance sheets and income statements.
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However, this requires assumptions regarding demand forecasts for the firm. But the
valuation proposed by analysts can be approximated in order to extend Q testing to
non-traded firms.
Due to diﬃculties in tracking financial constraints precisely in the Q-Cash flow
model, the Euler equation was devised as a new method of structural estimation in
the early 1990s (Gertler, Hubbard and Kashyap [1991], Hubbard and Kashyap [1992]).
Let us now investigate why applied econometricians are not so enthusiastic about this
alternative approach.
3.3. Euler Equations and Financial Constraints
On one hand, Q has the virtue to capture some, if not all, of the profit expectations.
On the other hand, as seen in the preceding section, the Q and Cash Flow model
of investment faces diﬃculties due to non-linear or non-structural parameter in the
estimated reduced form where both sensitivities may or may not depend on the extent
of financial constraints, measurement errors, short run valuation error on the equity
market, and the lack of data for the value of non traded firms at the microeconomic
level. Use of the Euler equation has been seen as an alternative to structural tests of
investment which avoids several of the problems faced by the Q model. It estimates
the equality between the marginal product of capital and the cost of capital including
marginal adjustment costs of investment now and marginal costs of investing next
period. The marginal productivity of capital is usually computed under the assump-
tions of homogeneity of capital and labour and of imperfect competition or decreasing
return to scale.
This marginal condition has been estimated taking into account the financial con-
straint designed as an increasing cost of debt as leverage increases (e.g. Bond and
Meghir [1994], Estrada and Valles [1998], Jaramillo, Schiantarelli and Weiss [1996],
van Ees et al. [1998], Gilchrist and Himmelberg [1998], Chatelain and Teurlai [2003]).
For example, Kaplan and Zingales [1997] proposed a similar theoretical model with-
out adjustment costs as an alternative to the Q cash-flow reduced form model, so
that these Euler equation estimations avoids some of their criticisms. The parame-
ter related to the cost of debt can be directly estimated. It provides a measure of
the financial constraints related to leverage. It has the same status than a structural
parameter.
However, if Euler equation estimations were relatively successful to integrating
leverage into investment equation, they prove disappointing with respect to the role
of cash-flow. Cash flow are often introduced in Euler equations which take account of
credit rationing:
L (LIQt)FK (Kt, Lt) = L (LIQt)
"
UCt + JK
Ã
It
Kt−1
,
It−1
Kt−2
!#
(3.2)
The Lagrange multiplier related L to the credit rationing constraint is param-
eterised as a linear function of cash-flow and other liquidity variables denoted LIQt
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(Whited [1992]). But the new parameter related to cash flow is not a structural one. It
is a combination of individual variables and of other parameters of the model, namely
the adjustment cost parameter and the mark-up parameter (Chatelain [2000]). On
the other hand, omitting cash flow in the Lagrange multiplier regularly leads to a
mis-specification of the Euler equation (Whited [1998], Chatelain and Teurlai [2003]).
The need to alter the specification of cash flow in the neo-classical Euler equation
without financial constraints may be related to the fact that this equation constrains
the investment ratio to be a negative function of EBITDA, a feature that the Lagrange
multiplier add-on corrects (this problem was noticed by Bond and Meghir [1994]). If
EBITDA was to be correlated with future cash-flow, then the Q result would favour an
opposite sign (positive) for the relationship between the investment ratio and cash-flow
instead of the one found in the neo-classical Euler equation.
Another major problem with Euler equations is related to the quadratic adjust-
ment costs assumption. Estimates of the adjustment cost parameter are sometimes
very small and not significant (whereas estimates of the adjustment cost parameter are
usually too large in the Q model, assuming Hayashi’s [1982] conditions). An example
using Belgium data is given by Barran and Peeters [1998]. As the production func-
tion is parameterised assuming homogeneity with respect to capital and labour, the
marginal productivity of capital is replaced by a function of average productivity where
capital appears only at the denominator. Investment then appears only in marginal
adjustment costs. If the marginal adjustment cost is not significant, investment be-
haviour is no longer explained by the Euler equation. There have been proposals for
removing the assumption of quadratic adjustment cost to a polynomial specification
(Whited [1998], Chatelain and Teurlai [2003]) or to another specification which allows
a higher number of lags of the investment ratio (Gerard and Verschueren [2002]) or
by assuming non-convex costs of adjustment (Cooper and Haltiwanger [1999]) .
It turns out that those problems have maintained alive and well the alternative
traditional auto-regressive distributed lags (ADL) specification of the neo-classical
Jorgensonian model omitting proxies for the cost of capital (Hall, Mairesse and Mulkay
[2000]) or taking into account the cost of capital (Chirinko, Fazzari and Meyer [1999]),
because of the flexibility of the distributed lag structure. What is more, the eﬀect of
the Jorgenson’s cost of capital on capital is not easy to isolate properly in the Euler
equation, because an homogeneous production function does not necessarily exhibit a
constant elasticity of substitution (hence a constant elasticity of the stock of capital
with respect to its cost) and because marginal adjustment costs, which are a function
of the investment ratio, are added besides the user cost of capital. On the other hand,
the ADL structure allows attempts to isolate the cost of capital channel of monetary
policy from the broad credit channel or the cash flow channel. This specification has
been chosen in the monetary transmission network of the European System of Central
Banks (for example, Chatelain et al. [2003]). As seen above, structural models of
investment (Q model and Euler equation) stop half way in the structural modelling
of financial constraints. The interpretation of the parameters of cash flow or of other
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liquidity variables faces the Lucas critique in these models as much as in the traditional
auto-regressive distributed lags models.
3.4. Private Accounting Data
The fact that these data are not aggregated should not conceal the fact that accounting
data are also fragile. Accountants can choose optimistic or pessimistic valuations for
several items related to future cash inflows or cash outflows. However, it is possible
to improve our use of accounting data for understanding investment. Oﬀ balance
sheet information such as leasing and discount could be taken into account in some
countries.
Discount is a short-run means of obtaining cash from banks by firms where they
give property rights to some of their trade receivables to banks. As a counterpart,
the banks provide the term with liquidity on which interest is charged. For financially
distressed firms, this can be a mean of finance which is accepted by banks because they
have the collateral in the form of the claims on other firms. By taking into account oﬀ
balance sheet discount, we increase the amount of trade credit on the asset side and
increase the amount of liquid debt on the liabilities side. Trade credit (trade payables
less trade receivables) can be a complement to external finance (Ramey [1998]).
A similar collateral argument holds for leasing. Leased capital remains the property
of the ”lender” even when the firm goes bankrupt. The lender receives rents from the
firm. The collateral consists of the leased capital itself, which mostly incurs the risk of
being depreciated at accelerated rate. In this context, leasing may be an opportunity
for some firms which are financially constrained. However, while it is easy to add leased
capital on the gross asset side, there are several ways of splitting rental contract flows
between depreciation flows and debt flows, as to whether this capital good had been
bought instead of rented. On the one hand, one can find the equivalent interest rate
for a debt contract (International Accounting Standards Committee recommendation)
and consider that the remaining value of the good is depreciated, but the depreciation
scheme does not fit any standard accounting depreciation rule. On the other hand, one
can apply a standard depreciation accounting rule and consider that the remaining
flows are related to a debt contract. In this case, the interest payments do not fit
existing debt contracts (this rule is used in Chatelain and Teurlai [2003], see also De
Bodt et al. [1996] and Sharpe and Nguyen [1995]).
3.5. Asset Prices
Trying to isolate the cost of capital channel of monetary policy from the broad credit
channel or the cash flow channel has been one of the goals of the firm studies in the
monetary transmission network of the European System of Central Banks [2003]. The
credit channel emphasises that credit availability is a function of collateral. The cycli-
cal movement of asset prices may modify the value of collateral. It is then useful to
investigate the asset price channel as a particular channel of the broad credit channel.
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Before going further, it is worth mentioning that monetary policy faces more diﬃcul-
ties in influencing asset prices than the consumer price index. Asset price expectations
driving speculative bubbles are not systematically aﬀected by monetary policy shocks
or central bankers’ declarations. Unfortunately, when speculative bubbles burst, cen-
tral banks sometimes have to provide liquidity for some financial intermediaries. Then,
after over-investment, the decline in asset prices may be long lasting.
A related problem concerns how to adapt asset prices indexes, where they exist,
to microeconomic data. Asset prices matter on the asset side in the case of buildings,
for example, which are partly taken into account by the sectoral investment price
index for computing real investment. Asset prices also matter for the valuation of the
financial assets owned by the firm and for the valuation of the firm’s equity liabilities.
As financial assets are valued at acquisition cost, one may revalue them by using the
equity price index. In principle, such revaluation may be anticipated by accountants
and put on the liability side under provisions, if the market value of the assets is
decreasing. Then, the share of financial assets may reflect the fact that a firm is
more sensitive to asset price fluctuations. It may also reflect the fact that a firm can
obtain finance from a group. It is also possible to revalue equity by taking account
of changes in asset prices. Finally, it leads to investigation of the trade-oﬀ between
financial investment and real investment, taking into account the risks of asset price
fluctuations in the case of financial investment.
4. Financial Constraints on Investment and Macroeconomic
modelling.
Once some of the four major financial constraints are taken into account, specific
intertemporal dynamics emerge as accumulation into equity of retained earnings, ob-
tained from profits. These dynamics modify the reactions of firms to shocks with
respect to the standard convex adjustment cost models. Without asset price fluctu-
ations, the accumulation of internal funds of credit rationed firms smooths capital
accumulation after a rise of productivity (or a fall in the cost of capital) with respect
to the neo-classical model with convex adjustment costs (Chatelain [1998]). As a
consequence, additional features are usually taken into account for explaining a finan-
cial accelerator, where financial constraints are supposed to amplify productivity or
demand shocks and exacerbate fluctuations. These additional features may be asset
prices fluctuations, the removal of the hypothesis of adjustment costs or of its con-
vexity, shifts in the allocation of savings towards private productive investment along
the business cycle, and so on. These features are more developed in recent business
cycles theory based on models of intertemporal investment facing financial constraints.
Hence, econometric evidence of financial constraints on investment supports some of
the four simplified assumptions of financial constraints aﬀecting investment behaviour
used in those models.
In the recent years, the accumulation of internal funds has been investigated in
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business cycle theory. This economic literature is highly indebted to the ideas devel-
oped in details by Irving Fisher’s [1933] seminal article on the debt/deflation episode
of the 1930s. Heterogeneity of the current year equity or current year debt/equity
ratio leads to diﬀerent accumulation path for firms in the certainty case (Kiyotaki and
Moore [1997]). This heterogeneity can be increased taking into account uncertainty
on profits next period due to productivity or demand shocks, which alters the amount
of retained earnings, and hence equity, in the next period. Research started with
constant returns to scale technology. This assumption allows capital aggregation so
that the distribution of equity and of capital is not necessary for studying the cycle
(Kiyotaki and Moore [1997], Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist [1998], Carlstrom and
Fuerst [1997], Aghion, Banerjee and Piketty [1998]). In Kiyotaki and Moore [1997],
asset prices fluctuations are endogenous but there is no focus on monetary policy.
In Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist [1998], asset price fluctuations or bubbles are not
endogenous. The cycle is driven by exogenous productivity shocks. But they consider
a monetary policy rule, which alters the economic cycle.
Further research considered decreasing returns to scale technology, once one re-
moves the fixed costs in some models (Gomes [2001], Cooley and Quadrini [2001],
Cooley and Quadrini [1999], Barlevy, G. [1998], Caballero, R. and M. Hammour [1998],
Den Haan, W. G. Ramey and J. Watson (1999)). Those recent papers have exam-
ined the general equilibrium compositional eﬀects of shocks if financing constraints
are present. It is necessary to know the distribution of equity (the firm’s net worth) to
compute or simulate the aggregate dynamics of capital. In those models, the hetero-
geneity of equity is fully taken into account but the investigation of the heterogeneity
of other characteristics of financial constraints is not yet so well developed. An attempt
to deal with the consequences of the heterogeneity of financial constraints for mon-
etary policy has been proposed recently by Bean, Larsen and Nikolov [2001]. A key
question is how to adapt monetary policy rules to the heterogeneity of firms reactions
to monetary policy shocks.
Finally, the accumulation of retained earnings in the equity dynamics can also
aﬀects long-term growth, as well as the business cycle. This can happen under three
conditions: if equity growth limits the tangible and intangible capital growth of in-
dividual firms, if the share of firms facing this growth limit is large in the economy,
and if the growth of intangible capital (for example research and development) and
of intangible capital is one of the driving forces of the economic growth of GDP (see
Romer [1986], and the subsequent literature assuming constant returns to scale for
the aggregate of all types of capital in the economy). A recent theoretical model is
proposed by Amable, Chatelain and Ralf [2002] and recent empirical evidence on the
relationship between financial structures and growth can be found in Demirgunc-Kunt
and Levine [2001].
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5. Conclusion
This paper reviewed problems related to the estimation of investment facing financial
constraints. A central question is the interpretation in applied work of the sensitivi-
ties of investment with respect to cash flow and other liquidity variables, which still
continues to face the Lucas critique. It is not easy to isolate the component of these
sensitivities related to financial constraints from components related to other features
of investment, such as technology, imperfect competition, expectations, and so on.
Much progress has been made in using new data sets and obtaining more and more
useful information out of them. Extensive use has been made of sophisticated panel
data econometric estimates dealing with endogeneity and endogenous selection prob-
lems. On the one hand, theory has raised more and more precise objections against
direct interpretations of these sensitivities as measures of financial constraints. On
the other hand, theory has produced new results on financial constraints, capable, for
example, of handling the heterogeneity of firms. However, there are still no answers
to the Lucas critique. One of the reasons is that some characteristics of investment
other than financial constraints also present testable diﬃculties (for example, adjust-
ment costs, see Hamermesh and Pfann [1996]). Another reason may be the diversity
of financial regimes faced by firms.
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